by Kayla Anandia
This article was written by an undergraduate student at the University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa as part of their independent research with the Indo-Pacific Policy Lab.
Abstract
On August 28, 2023, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) published a map updating its territorial claims in the South China Sea (SCS), sparking tensions with neighboring Southeast Asian countries. Drawing on academic literature, media reports, and government documents, this article examines the PRC’s recent shift from its 9-dash line policy to the 10-dash line policy and the implications for the territorial disputes in the South China Sea. Then, the article evaluates the perspectives and responses of two Southeast Asian claimant states, the Philippines and Indonesia. Indonesia was the chair of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) when the announcement was made and has a relatively close relationship with China, while the Philippines is a military ally of the United States. The analysis sheds light on the internal vulnerabilities within ASEAN, which are rooted in economic ties and regional polarization due to global power competition. It concludes by discussing broader implications for the South China Sea disputes.
Introduction
On August 28, 2023, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) published a map updating its territorial claims in the South China Sea (SCS), sparking tensions with neighboring Southeast Asian countries. This map was a modified version of China’s already controversial “9-Dash Line” map, which was initially drawn in the 1930s and encompasses 90 percent of the South China Sea, overlapping the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) of Indonesia, the Philippines, Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia, and Vietnam.
The updated map released in 2023 adheres to the 9-dash line map, featuring the same configuration of the nine dashed lines with one added dashed line. The 10 dashed lines have territorial overlaps of the EEZs of the Philippines, Vietnam, Taiwan, and the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh and the Aksai Chin Plateau. The placement of the tenth dash officially encompasses the island of Taiwan into its core territory.[1] The updated map exerts China’s claims beyond the 9-dash line, as it boldly reintroduced the 10th dash East of Taiwan. The move reaffirms China’s ownership of Taiwan, as well as expanding China’s influence beyond the recognized waters of Taiwan, further directly challenging the principles outlined in Part II of UNCLOS on Territorial Seas and Contiguous Zones.[2]
Drawing on academic literature, media reports, and government documents, this article examines the PRC’s recent shift in policy and the responses of two Southeast Asian claimant states, the Philippines and Indonesia. While the Philippines is a US ally and has received a great deal of attention in recent months, Indonesia has a relatively close relationship with China, and it was also the ASEAN chair when the announcement was made. A comparison of these two countries sheds additional light on the dynamics and internal vulnerabilities of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), rooted in economic ties and geopolitical competition. The article concludes by discussing the implications for the broader dynamics of the South China Sea disputes.
The 10-Dash Line
Since approximately 2006, the PRC has regularly released a “standard map” or the 9-dash line, which was aimed at eliminating maps that did not follow China’s territorial integrity and its perception of Chinese maritime space. The PRC’s map was strategically released one week before India’s 2023 G20 Presidency and Indonesia’s 2023 Chairmanship for the 43rd ASEAN Summit to ensure that it would influence or provoke diplomatic responses from regional key players.[3] President Xi Jinping’s last-minute absence from both summits serves as a symbolic gesture, indicating China’s deliberate consideration and strategic maneuvering regarding adherence to international rule-based order and norms, which is evidently non-existent.
It was intended to serve as strategic messaging to highlight China’s dominance in the region without the need for immediate physical enforcement actions, a typical approach of Chinese diplomacy called a “delaying strategy”.[4] The delaying strategy allows China to prolong Code of Conduct (COC) negotiations and discussions, enabling the assertion of its territorial claims without resorting to the use of force. The updated map counteracted the achievement of the agreed upon ASEAN-PRC COC Guidelines aimed to accelerate negotiations that have been underway for approximately two decades. These guidelines were agreed upon during the ASEAN Foreign Ministers meeting with the Director of Foreign Affairs Committee of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Wang Yi, on July 13, 2023.[5] During the meeting, both parties have agreed that the COC negotiations must be complete before Fall 2026.[6] China continues to delay in achieving a mutually agreed COC because China seeks unrestricted governance and authority over their economic and military activities in the South China Sea. This includes diminishing US control over regional shipping lanes, constructing industrial outposts and military bases on artificial islands, and extending its influence beyond the First Island Chain encompassing Indonesia, Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines, into the Pacific.[7]
To further showcase China’s active commitments in establishing its territorial claims, the release came during the escalation of China’s aggression in the South China Sea, emphasizing the country’s determination to safeguard its maritime sovereignty through military force and assertive tactics. China’s aggressive behavior is marked by the deployment of Chinese naval vessels, harassment of Filipinos personnel by using military-grade lasers and water-cannon and blocking Filipino fishermen from their fishing grounds through forceful impacts of their boats and seizing their catch.[8]
China’s overarching motivation behind the strategic release of the map revolves around solidifying control over the South China Sea and overall region. In a press conference on August 30, 2023, PRC’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson, Wang Wenbin, has noted that the updated map was a “routine practice in China’s exercise of sovereignty in accordance with the law.” This serves as one of PRC’s methods in legitimizing its maritime sovereign claims over portions of its EEZs. [9] Nevertheless, it contradicts international law and norms, as the map extends across the entirety of the sea space, islands, and sea features of the South China Sea, overlapping claims by other claimants.
The PRC perceives maritime and international law as products of Western customs. Thus, under President Xi Jinping’s current regime, the PRC’s foreign policy core interests include securing China’s maritime periphery in the Indo-Pacific region and rewriting the global rules-based order.[10] China’s foreign policy patterns involves a two-fold of characteristics; the regular release of its map rejecting international law and other states’ territorial sovereignty, and its growing Chinese presence through the militarization of islands and unlawful personnel behaviors in the South China Sea. Therefore, the release of the updated 2023 map and the growing aggressive Chinese behavior was not unexpected. However, the coupled foreign policy strategy and the lack of a binding COC has fostered geopolitical instability and tension within the Indo-Pacific region due to its contentious implications and provocative nature. By disregarding UNCLOS and asserting territorial claims over the EEZs of ASEAN nations, India, and Taiwan, the 10-dash line constitutes as a momentum of division in governing the South China Sea.
Reactions from the Philippines
Maritime territorial disputes in the South China Sea between the Philippines and China are a recurring issue of contention. On July 12, 2016, the 2016 Arbitration Ruling constituted under UNCLOS, between the Philippines and the PRC on the South China Sea overwhelmingly favored the Philippines, which determined that China’s major elements of maritime claims were unlawful. PRC’s elements for maritime claims were centered around the vague depiction of its 9-dash line map. Coupled with the 9-dash line, since approximately 2009, China has increased military presence and aggression, and starting in 2013, have started land reclamation activities. Following the ruling, as predicted, China reacted negatively, and its Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated in a press release that it was “null and void and has no binding force”.[11] Currently, years after the ruling was officially released by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Hague, China remains steadfast in its stance as they completely disregard the ruling and continue to persist on abiding to its own governance in the South China Sea. China remains to pursue activities that consolidates their position with minimum consideration to the ruling; they continue to increase its militarism, engage in commercial exploration, and land reclamation activities in the disputed areas.[12]
On January 3–5, 2023, Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. visited Beijing, alongside 200 member delegations of senior officials and business leaders. This state visit was President Ferdinand Marcos Jr.’s first visit to China, which resulted in 14 signed bilateral cooperation agreements and over $20 billion in new investments focused on tourism, trade, and information exchange.[13] Additionally, during President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. and President Xi Jinping personal meetings, the two leaders “agreed to manage maritime differences amicably and commit to rekindle trust and sincerity with one of its strongest partners, China.”[14] The state visit alongside the bilateral agreements and investments seemed to indicate that the two countries were working on strengthening its turbulent relationship.
China’s continuous aggressive behavior towards the Philippines and its assertion of the 10-dash line map contradicts the perceived improvement in bilateral relations highlighted by President Ferdinand Marcos Jr.’s visit to Beijing in January 2023. Leading up to the release of the 10-dash line map, the 3-day visit occurred amid rising Chinese militarization and aggressive behavior. Despite the signing of numerous bilateral cooperation agreements and significant investments, the updated map completely undermines the notion of strengthened ties, as China does not recognize the Philippine’s maritime sovereignty, alongside the 2016 Arbitration Ruling.
The release of the new map coincided with the Philippines’ successful efforts in passing “The Philippine Maritime Zones Bill,” in May 2023, which is aimed to set the state’s archipelagic boundaries, internal waters, and exclusive economic zones (EEZs). The bill is the Philippines’ strategy in reiterating and enshrining its maritime territorial claims in the West Philippine Sea, in line with the 2016 Arbitration Ruling.[15]
Following China’s release of updated map the on August 23, the Philippines’ Department of Foreign Affairs, alongside other nations such as India, Malaysia, Vietnam, and Taiwan, filed a diplomatic protest on August 31.[16] The Philippines’ National Security Adviser, Mr. Eduardo M. Año, reiterated the Philippine government’s position and noted that there will be a growing response from other countries in “rejecting the updated map because it violates the 2016 Arbitration Ruling, which already invalidates the 9-dash line map, which was final and binding.”[17] He also emphasized the Philippines’ commitment to leveraging the arbitral ruling as a strategic tool.
Since the map was released, various Filipino government officials have been vocal in speaking strongly against the updated map. Senator Risa Hontiveros called China “delusional” and stated that the new map is “Beijing’s desperate attempt to assert its lies and propaganda.”[18] Moreover, the Philippine President of the Senate, Mr. Juan Miguel Zubiri complained that “completing the COC will be very slow between ASEAN countries because there are also countries in ASEAN that are relatively close to China.” [19] This indicated that the Philippines was concerned that these diplomatic relations among China and ASEAN member states would influence and complicate internal ASEAN decision-making.
At the 43rd ASEAN Summit held in Jakarta on September 5, 2023; President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. urged fellow ASEAN members to advocate for a rules-based international order. He emphasized the importance of upholding Freedom of Navigation and Overflight in the South China Sea in alignment with international law, as well as pushing efforts to craft an ASEAN joint statement addressing China’s actions, aiming to mitigate geopolitical tensions.[20] Furthermore, he emphatically rejected misleading narratives that inaccurately portray the SCS disputes involving the Philippines as a mere proxy in China-US competition.
Recent tensions have escalated, prompting to further conflict between the Philippines and the PRC. On March 23, 2024, PRC’s, and the Philippines’ Coast Guard had an hour-long “stand-off”, located off the Second Thomas Shoal. The confrontation took place as the Philippine coast guard were resupplying a force of sailors on board to the sunken Sierra Madre off Second Thomas Shoal. The Philippines’ military released a video clip that showed a white ship marked “China Coast Guard”, crossing the grey Filipino supply boat vessel “Unaizah May 4”, and unleashing its water cannon.[21] In turn, President Marcos Jr. has announced on countermeasures plans against what he denounces as “illegal, coercive, aggressive, and dangerous attacks” by the Chinese Coast Guard.
His resolute stance reflects the Philippines’ long-standing commitment to defending its territorial integrity and sovereignty. President Marcos Jr.’s statement on March 28, 2024, encapsulates this sentiment, asserting that “We will not be cowed into silence, submission, or subservience. Filipinos do not yield.”[22] The Philippines has consistently been vocal in voicing their concerns and grievances over China’s provocative actions in the South China Sea, demonstrating its unwavering dedication to upholding international law and protecting its interests in the region.
Reactions from Indonesia
Throughout 2023, Indonesia’s Coordinating Minister of Maritime Affairs and Investment, Luhut Binsar Pandjaitan, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Retno Marsudi, and other Indonesian government counterparts, frequently engaged with China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its State Council in deepening its Comprehensive Strategic Cooperation between Indonesia and PRC.[23] A number of high-profile investment projects by China in Indonesia had been announced earlier in the year. Indonesia is the largest investment recipient of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in Southeast Asia, with approximately USD $7.3 Billion in investments.[24] The BRI has significantly contributed to the advancement of Indonesia’s infrastructure and mining sector with investments in the various vital projects, such as the Jakarta-Bandung High-Speed Rail, which first operated in October of 2023 and Indonesia Morowali Industrial Park (IMIP) – recognized as the largest nickel processing park in Asia. Notably, a substantial investment of USD $32 Billion has been directed towards President Jokowi’s enduring legacy project, “Ibu Kota Nusantara,” (IKN) which is the relocation of Indonesia’s capital city to Nusantara in the Kalimantan island.[25] Immediately before the release of China’s updated map, President Jokowi’s administration was focused on ensuring that Chinese agreements and investments in Indonesia were being successfully delivered.
Indonesia, as a key leader within ASEAN, displayed comparatively restrained reactions and responses compared to the Philippines. As chair for the 43rd ASEAN Summit that occurred shortly after the release of the map on September 7–9, Indonesia’s theme of “ASEAN Matters: Epicentrum of Growth” was focused on developing and strengthening ASEAN cooperation with external parties, as well as navigating through conflict, including the COC in the South China Sea. As tensions escalated, Minister Retno Marsudi consistently emphasized that states must comply with international law, saying that “the drawing of any lines, any claims, must be in accordance with UNCLOS 1982”.[26] Additionally, Minister Marsudi also noted that she would not be surprised if several states raised the latest developments: “it’s not a new issue for us.”[27] In his ASEAN Summit opening statement, President Jokowi recognized the presence of geopolitical tension and division without specifying details; he warned fellow ASEAN member states to not succumb into any major-power rivalry; “Do not make our ship, ASEAN, an arena of rivalry that destroys each other”.[28]
President Jokowi’s and Minister Retno Marsudi’s ambiguous language further emphasizes Indonesia’s long-standing stance on neutrality towards the disputes. Both carefully chose their diction when discussing the South China Sea, as it could escalate tensions and/or may indicate some sort of bias.
Notably, parts of China’s territorial claims have overlap with Indonesia’s EEZs located near the Natuna Islands. While China has acknowledged Indonesia’s sovereignty in the Natuna islands, there were escalated incidents triggered by Chinese fishing vessels activities up until 2020.[29] Therefore, congruent with the sensitivity of geopolitical protests and tensions and past incidents between China and Indonesia, the incumbent Commander of the Indonesian National Armed Forces, Admiral Yudo Margono, decided to relocate the first-ever ASEAN Joint Military Drills from the North Natuna Sea to the South Natuna Sea that was taken place on September 19 – 24, 2024.[30] The 5-day series of naval exercises focused on humanitarian disaster responses and improving the states’ military cooperation. By shifting the location of the drills to the South Natuna Sea, Indonesia aimed to avoid any reactions from China, indicating its commitment to maintaining stability and security in the region. The overall decision reflects Indonesia’s pragmatic approach to regional security challenges, prioritizing cooperation and stability while carefully navigating the complex geopolitical landscape of the South China Sea.
Examining Indonesia’s relations with China reveals a nuanced dynamic that may impact Indonesia’s reactions and responses towards the 10-dash line. Indonesia stands as the dominant power in Southeast Asia, serving as a focal point of China’s influence while maintaining its status as “unaligned”. This dual role places Indonesia in a delicate balancing act, where its interactions with China holds strategic implications for both regional dynamics and global geopolitics. During a visit by PRC’s State Councilor and Foreign Minster to the ASEAN secretariat in Jakarta in February 2023, Qin Gang reiterated China’s goals to cultivate and sustain positive and stable ties with Indonesia, seemingly positioning itself to influence the dynamics between ASEAN member states and external dialogue partners, particularly with China.[31] Mr. Gang urged that ASEAN must uphold “strategic autonomy” – indicating that member states should make and execute strategic decisions without undue reliance on external entities or influences. This statement, however, presents as a striking contradiction considering how vast China’s economic and political leverage is towards Indonesia. China’s extensive investment and trade ties with Indonesia create a complex interdependency that may subtly shape Indonesia strategic calculus in COC negotiations, favoring PRC’s endeavors and activities in the South China Sea.
In essence, the rate and scope of bilateral engagements between Indonesia and China is considered to be highly unusual, surpassing China’s engagements and relations with any other ASEAN member state. Indonesia, as a developing country and as a middle power in Asia will naturally prioritize domestic economic growth over foreign policy.[32] However, it is hard to overlook and disregard that Indonesia’s growth as a nation is dependent on China’s BRI investments, fostering slight polarization siding with China. The significant economic influence wielded by China during President Jokowi’s administration underscores Indonesia’s apparent absence of assertive leadership within ASEAN, particularly in navigating the escalating tensions in the South China Sea and providing support to fellow member states. Nevertheless, Indonesia remains committed to upholding an independent foreign policy stance, as the country benefits from both China and the US. The US is Indonesia’s largest security engagement partner with over 220 annual military engagements and $1.9 billion in current military sales.[33] Therefore, with the ongoing global power rivalry between the United States and China, Indonesia refuses to compromise its ties with either nation. This approach reflects Indonesia’s determination to maintain diplomatic autonomy while balancing its relationships with major powers in the region.
Implications and Conclusion
The release of the PRC’s 10-Dash Line Map on the South China Sea has further sparked geopolitical tensions in the region. There are two major findings concluded within this article. First, analyzing the bilateral relations between the Philippines and Indonesia with China, prior to the release of the map, indicates a pattern of Chinese dominance demonstrated through economic agreements and investments. These agreements and investments served as a key aspect of China’s diplomatic strategy, aiming to strengthen ties with neighboring countries and expand its influence in the region. In the case of the Philippines, President Ferdinand Marcos Jr.’s visit to Beijing resulted in numerous bilateral agreements and substantial investments, indicating a warming of relations between the two nations. Similarly, Indonesia has also witnessed a surge in Chinese investments through the BRI. This pattern of using economic incentives to exert influence over Southeast Asian states in the midst of US-China power rivalry in the region.
Second, it is evident that the Philippines and Indonesia exhibit significant disparities in their responses to the release of the map. The Philippines have consistently and vigorously denounced China’s unlawful actions, expressing strong vocal opposition. In contrast, Indonesia has maintained a muted and restrained stance, often diverting attention through vague language, or avoiding direct acknowledgment of the geopolitical tensions at hand. The notable gap in the reactions of the two ASEAN member states highlights ASEAN’s internal vulnerabilities of disunity when addressing security matters. ASEAN operates on consensus, mutual cooperation, and adhering to its non-intervention policy, however, the regional bloc continues to be divided in responding and dealing with China’s aggressive and unlawful behaviors in the South China Sea.
The lack of unity within ASEAN poses various significant risks to regional stability. First, in the absence of unanimous support from all ASEAN member states to contest China’s behavior, the affected claimant states (the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Brunei Darussalam) are actively seeking assistance from non-ASEAN partners. Individual ASEAN claimants have the ability to seek stronger diplomatic and strategic alliances with external partners against China, including the Quad or AUKUS.[34] In turn this signifies a potential shift towards a “New Cold War” dynamic, where all Southeast Asian states are polarized and highly susceptible to external pressure from major powers.
Second, ASEAN’s credibility as a regional organization committed to peaceful conflict resolution and adherence to international law is undermined when member states are unable to present a unified front on South China Sea conflict. This diminishes ASEAN’s foundation as a regional bloc and weakens its ability to act as a credible mediator or facilitator in resolving disputes.
In conclusion, the release of the updated map and the greater dynamics of the South China Sea serves as a test towards ASEAN’s ability to navigate complex geopolitical challenges and maintain unity in the face of external pressures. The division faced by ASEAN, as shown by the divergence of the Philippines’ and Indonesia’s reactions, further accentuates the delicate balance between upholding national sovereignty and regional governance driven by economic and political interest. Moving forward, ASEAN must focus on keeping robust engagement and dialogue between ASEAN and PRC to further accelerate COC negotiations and meeting the goal of completing the COC negotiations before 2026. This engagement may take the form of frequent bilateral and multilateral ministerial and working group meetings. Moreover, achieving a mutually agreed upon COC alone will not stop territorial disputes; all ASEAN member states should focus on de-escalating tensions by demonstrating a united front against China’s actions. In order to do so, ASEAN should perhaps rethink its non-intervention policy and establish a joint military patrol in disputed areas, aimed at controlling escalated aggressive Chinese behavior and maintaining peace and stability. With a coordinated joint military patrol, the claimant states would be able to recalibrate the asymmetry of China’s military presence, which may enable them to ultimately deter China over time, encouraging it to resort to negative diplomatic remarks rather than physical conflict.[35] Additionally, collective action will symbolize ASEAN’s commitment to maritime cooperation, while helping to protect the respective member states’ maritime sovereignty.
Kayla Anandia is an undergraduate student and a member of the Indo-Pacific Policy Lab at the University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa.
The views expressed in this publication are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Center for Indo-Pacific Affairs or any organization with which the author is affiliated.
© 2024 University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa Center for Indo-Pacific Affairs. All rights reserved.
[1] Troy Clayman, China’s New Map: The 10-Dash Line, Boston Political Review, December 22, 2023.
[2] John P. Ruehl, Why China’s New Map Has Stirred Regional Tensions, Savage Minds, October 21, 2023.
[3] Salman Rafi Shiekh, Beijing Shoots Itself in Foot with ‘10-Dash Line’ Map, Asia Sentinel, September 8, 2023.
[4] M. Taylor Fravel, “China’s Strategy in the South China Sea,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, 33 (3), 2011, 292–319.
[5] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, ASEAN-China Agree on Guidelines to Accelerate Negotiations for the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea, July 13, 2023.
[6] Niniek Karmini and Jim Gomez, China and ASEAN Agree to Try to Conclude Nonaggression Pact on Sea Feud in 3 Years, Associated Press News, July 12, 2023.
[7] John P. Ruehl, Why China’s New Map Has Stirred Regional Tensions.
[8] Zahenna Rasheed, How an Impasse in the South China Sea Drove the Philippines, US Closer.” Al Jazeera, December 30, 2023.
[9] Consulate-General of the PRC in Adelaide, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Wang Wenbin’s Regular Press Conference on August 30, 2023, August 30, 2023.
[10] Sardor Allayarov, International Law with Chinese Characteristics: The South China Sea Territorial Dispute, Institute of International Relations Prague, June 19, 2023.
[11] Caitlin Campbell and Nargiza Salidjanova, South China Sea Arbitration Ruling: What Happened and What’s Next?, US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, July 12, 2016.
[12] Praktik Jakhar, Whatever Happened to the South China Sea Ruling?, The Interpreter, July 12, 2021.
[13] Paul Haenle and Charmaine Misalucha-Willoughby, The Missed Opportunity of Philippine President Marcos Jr’s First Visit to China, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 31, 2023.
[14] Herman Tiu Laurel, Marcos’ Visit to Reinvigorate ‘Strongest Partnership, Global Times, January 3, 2023.
[15] Mike Firn and Taejun Kang, Beijing Condemns Manila’s Maritime Zones Act, Radio Free Asia, March 7, 2024.
[16] Troy Clayman, China’s New Map: The 10-Dash Line.
[17] Samuel Medenilla, China Faces Growing International Rejection with 10-Dash Line Map – PHL NSA Chief, Business Mirror, August 31, 2023..
[18] Anna Felicia Bajo, Marcos on China’s 10-Dash Line Map: We Will Respond to This, GMA Network, September 1, 2023.
[19] Charie Abarca, Zubiri Sees More Protests over China’s 10-Dash Line Map: ‘We Won’t Be Alone This Time’, Inquirer Net, August 31, 2023.
[20] Ruth Abbey Gita-Carlos, PH to Take Appropriate Action on China’s New SCS Map – PBBM, Philippine News Agency, September 1, 2023.
[21] Al Jazeera, Philippines Accuses China of New Water Cannon Attacks in South China Sea, March 23, 2024.
[22] Alexandra Sharp, The Philippines Announces Plans to Counter Chinese Coast Guard Attacks, Foreign Policy, March 28, 2024.
[23] Muhammad Zulfikar Rakhmat and Yeta Purnama, China-Indonesia Relations in 2023: A Year-in-Review, Stratsea, December 25, 2023.
[24] Christoph Nedopil Wang, China Belt and Road Intiative (BRI) Investment Report 2023, Green Finance and Development Center, February 5, 2024.
[25] Pongphisoot (Paul) Busbarat, Alvin Camba, Fadhila Inas Pratiwi, Sovinda Po, Hoàng Đỗ, Bouadam Sengkhamkhoutlavong, Tham Siew Yean, and Moe Thuzar, How Has China’s Belt and Road Initiative Impacted Southeast Asian Countries?, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, December 5, 2023.
[26] Laila Afifa, Indonesia Comments on China Staking Territorial Claim on 2023 Standard Map, Tempo, August 31, 2023.
[27] Nitish Verma, ASEAN Leaders to Meet in Jakarta amid Myanmar and South China Sea, BNN Breaking News, September 26, 2023.
[28] Cabinet Secretariat of the Republic of Indonesia, President Jokowi: ASEAN Is Not a Proxy for Any Power, September 5, 2023.
[29] Damos Dumoli Agusman, Natuna Waters: Explaining a Flashpoint between Indonesia and China, Indonesian Journal of International Law, 20, 2023, 617–648.
[30] Yuddy Cahya Budiman, ASEAN Kicks off Its First-Ever Joint Military Drills in Indonesia, Reuters, September 18, 2023.
[31] Association of Southeast Asian Nations, China’s Foreign Minister Reaffirms Commitment to Partnership with ASEAN, February 22, 2023.
[32] Lucas Myers, Indonesia Should Be at the Heart of US Indo-Pacific Policy, The Wilson Quarterly, Spring 2023.
[33] US Department of State, Integrated Country Strategy – Indonesia, March 31, 2022.
[34] Chetra Chap, ASEAN Remains Divided Over China’s Assertiveness in South China Sea, VOA, September 12, 2023
[35] Chester Cabalza, Joshua Bernard Espeña, and Ralph Romulus Frondoza, The Case for Joint Patrols in the South China Sea, Geopolitical Monitor, October 31, 2023.