Talk 1: Differential Privacy: Meanings and Caveats
Professor of Computer Science
Wednesday, September 7, 9:00-10:00 AM
Over the last decade, differential privacy (DP) has emerged as the standard privacy notion for research in privacy-preserving data analysis and publishing. However, there is an ongoing debate about the meaning and value of DP. Some hail that the notion of DP offers strong privacy protection regardless of the adversary's prior knowledge while enabling all kinds of data analysis. Others offer criticisms regarding DP's privacy guarantee and utility limitations. In this talk we explore the meanings of DP, trying to answer the question: “Under what condition(s), the notion of DP delivers the promised privacy guarantee?” We show that the answer is quite nuanced and depends on legal and ethical considerations that need to be discussed by the community.
About the Speaker:
Ninghui Li is a Professor of Computer Science at Purdue University. His research interests are in security and privacy. He is currently on the editorial boards of ACM Transactions on Privacy and Security (TOPS), Journal of Computer Security (JCS), and ACM Transactions on Internet Technology. Prof. Li is Vice Chair of ACM Special Interest Group on Security, Audit and Control (SIGSAC). He has served on the Program Committees of over 100 international conferences and workshops in computer security, databases, and data mining, including serving as Program Chair for 2014 and 2015 ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS), ACM's flagship conference in the field of security and privacy.
Talk 2: Electronic Voting: Danger and Opportunities
Professor of Computer Science & Engineering
University of Michigan
Friday, September 9, 9:00-10:00 AM
This summer’s hack of the Democratic National Committee drew attention to the threat of attackers interfering in national elections, and led the Department of Homeland Security to consider designating elections as “critical infrastructure”. Unfortunately, the U.S. and many other countries have become dependent on badly insecure e-voting technologies that are ripe for attack and have received little attention from the security community. In this talk, I will discuss that state of e-voting security in 2016, as illuminated by my first-hand studies in the U.S., India, Estonia, Australia, and elsewhere around the world. Computerized voting raises startling security risks, from voting machine viruses to state-level attacks that could centrally alter election returns. At the same time, there are opportunities for technology--designed correctly and applied intelligently--to make elections more secure and efficient than ever.
About the Speaker:
J. Alex Halderman is Professor of Computer Science and Engineering at the University of Michigan and Director of Michigan’s Center for Computer Security and Society. His interests include computer and network security, Internet security measurement, censorship resistance, and electronic voting, as well as the interaction of technology with law and international affairs. Named one of Popular Science’s “Brilliant 10” for 2015, his recent projects include ZMap, Let’s Encrypt, and the TLS Logjam and DROWN vulnerabilities.