by Ana Aravena
This article was written by a graduate student at the University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa as part of their research with the Indo-Pacific Policy Lab.
Abstract
This paper examines the strategic tension between the United States’ shift toward integrated deterrence and its historical impulse for unilateral control. In using Victor Cha’s powerplay theory, the analysis explores the transition from Cold War era “hub-and-spokes” to modern flexible alliance networks such as the Quad, AUKUS, and the 2025 South Korea (ROK) nuclear submarine agreement. The paper argues there is a contradiction in today’s US strategy: while the US promotes a latticework of regional security to counter China’s growing global influence, Washington’s domestic political signaling—symbolized by the rebranding of the Department of War—and the unpredictable trade tariffs create the institutional lack of trust required for true integration. Through examining bureaucratic friction (such as the International Traffic in Arms Regulations) and industrial supply chain vulnerabilities, this paper identifies industrial determinism within the ROK submarine deal as a superior model for resilience, moving beyond symbolic assurances toward irreversible economic and military co-dependence. Overall, this study concludes that Washington’s inability to declassify critical intelligence and step away from the transactional “America First” rallying cry makes its flexible networks operationally brittle. Without a fundamental shift from power-hoarding to genuine partnership, integrated deterrence will remain an aspirational diplomatic concept rather than a credible military reality capable of countering China’s regional dominance.
Introduction
In February of 2025, the Honolulu Defense Forum convened under a banner of urgent cooperation, yet the mood in the discussion panels told a different story. While American keynotes called for a “seamless wall” of allied technology to counter China, the breakout sessions revealed a desperate and unmet demand for engineers, open intelligence channels, and genuine partnership. This dissonance—between the rhetoric of unity and the reality of friction—was exacerbated months later when the Second Trump Administration issued an executive order renaming the Department of Defense to the Department of War. This symbolic pivot to aggressive unilateralism has sent shockwaves through the Indo-Pacific, forcing allies to question the true nature of American integrated deterrence.
Contemporary US strategy relies on flexible alliance networks like the Quad and AUKUS to modernize security in the region. Unlike the rigid, bilateral “hub-and-spokes” system of the Cold War, these new networks theoretically promise equal partnership and fluid integration. However, the operational reality suggests the United States has not abandoned its historical desire for dominance. Drawing on Victor Cha’s Powerplay theory, this paper argues that the US is attempting to replicate the control of the “hub-and-spokes“ model within these modern frameworks, creating a fatal strategic contradiction: by prioritizing “America First” aggression—epitomized by the Department of War—while simultaneously refusing to declassify the intelligence and technology allies need, the United States renders its flexible networks operationally brittle, leaving “integrated deterrence” as a hollow diplomatic concept rather than a credible military reality.
Theoretical Framework
Defining the Terms: From “Classical” to “Integrated”
First, we must establish our definitions to understand the stakes of the current strategic environment. What is deterrence? The Britannica Dictionary offers two distinct meanings: first, “the act of making someone decide not to do something,” and second, in a political context, “the policy of developing a lot of military power so that other countries will not attack your country.”[1] This first definition describes the general theory in international relations—inhibiting foreign adversaries from initiating conflict. However, it is the second definition that characterizes classical deterrence, which has been the primary mode of American engagement until the last few years.
Classical deterrence dominated the 20th century, specifically the Cold War era following the proliferation of nuclear weapons.[2] Fundamentally punishment-based, it operates on the binary logic of “if you hit me, I will hit you harder.” As Dr. Chris Dolan notes, classical deterrence focused on building up overwhelming military power to frighten adversaries, premised on the belief that the escalation of conflict would result in mutually assured destruction (MAD).[3] It relied heavily on capabilities (nuclear warheads, tank battalions) and credibility (the adversary’s belief that the US would actually use them).
Integrated deterrence, by contrast, represents a shift from punishment to denial. In the current multi-polar security environment—characterized by gray-zone warfare, cyber coercion, and the rise of China—mere military mass is insufficient. Integrated deterrence is defined as the “seamless combination of capabilities to convince potential adversaries that the costs of their hostile activities outweigh their benefits.”[4] Unlike its classical predecessor, integrated deterrence as a concept not only includes multiple domains (land, air, sea, cyber, space), but also “incorporat[es] artificial intelligence, machine learning, quantum computing, and autonomous systems” across a network of allies and partners.[5] It relies not just on firepower, but on interoperability—systems talking to each other—and trust. This creates a central tension: integrated deterrence requires the United States to share sensitive technology and decision-making power with allies, demanding a level of trust that classical deterrence never required.
The Genealogy of Control: Victor Cha’s “Powerplay”
To understand why the United States struggles to implement this new integrated model, we must look to the origins of its alliance system. Following World War II, the United States established the “San Francisco System” (1951), a network of bilateral alliances with Asian states (US-Japan, US-Korea, US-Taiwan) rather than a multilateral “Asian NATO.”
The standard historical view suggests that the US chose this bilateral structure because Asian countries, harboring deep historical animosities toward one another (particularly toward Japan), refused to join a collective security pact. However, Victor Cha challenges this narrative with his “Powerplay” thesis. Cha argues that the bilateral structure was not a consolation prize, but a deliberate design choice by the United States to exercise “maximum control” over its smaller allies.[6]
In the early Cold War, Washington was terrified of entrapment. Aggressive, anti-communist leaders like Syngman Rhee in South Korea and Chiang Kai-shek in Taiwan were viewed as potential liabilities who might unilaterally start a war with China or the Soviet Union and drag the United States into a nuclear conflict. Cha terms the US strategy “Rhee-straint” or “Chaining Chiang,” noting that the United States created tight bilateral treaties to “constrain ‘rogue allies’—that is, rabidly anticommunist dictators who might start wars for reasons of domestic legitimacy.”[7]
The Result: Control Over Integration
The resulting “hub-and-spokes” system was designed like a bicycle wheel: “you have a hub, that’s the great power; and then you have spokes… with not much interaction among the spokes.”[8] By keeping its allies separate, the United States ensured that all intelligence and security decisions flowed through Washington. The crucial point for this analysis is that the foundational architecture of US presence in the Indo-Pacific was designed for control, not integration.
The “New” Powerplay: The Strategic Contradiction
This historical “desire for control” creates a profound strategic contradiction in 2025. Theoretically, the United States has pivoted to integrated deterrence, which necessitates a “lattice-like” network where allies share data and technology freely to counter China’s gray-zone coercion. However, the political actions of the second Trump administration suggest a return to the “hub” mentality of the 1950s—specifically, the “New Powerplay.”
This contradiction is epitomized by the administration’s 2025 executive order renaming the Department of Defense to the Department of War.[9] While framed domestically as a restoration of “peace through strength,” internationally, this rebranding signals a return to aggressive, unilateral US dominance. It reinforces the “hub” dynamic, telling allies that the United States is the sole warfighter, while they are merely supporting spokes.
This creates a fatal flaw in the flexible alliance networks of the Quad and AUKUS. Integrated deterrence requires deep institutional trust; it demands that the US share classified nuclear propulsion technology (as in AUKUS) or advanced cyber-intelligence. Yet, by projecting a hyper-nationalist “Department of War” posture, Washington alienates the very public trust in Japan and South Korea required to sustain these networks. The US is attempting to operationalize a strategy that requires integration (sharing power) while simultaneously enacting a political agenda of control (hoarding power). As long as this “New Powerplay” persists, flexible alliances will remain brittle—strong in diplomatic rhetoric, but operationally hollow.
The Threat and The Response: Flexible Networks
The architecture of security in the Indo-Pacific, historically defined by the US-led bilateral “hub-and-spokes” system, is evolving into a flexible, layered security “latticework” in direct response to China’s strategic ambition to reshape the regional order. This transition, often characterized as hub-and-spokes 2.0, is defined by the competition between two comprehensive approaches to deterrence. This section analyzes China’s strategic network and the efficacy of the primary US-led response mechanisms: the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), AUKUS, and the unprecedented South Korea nuclear submarine agreement.
China’s Strategic Network: Coercion and Dual-Use Dominance
China’s strategy for achieving regional primacy relies on an expansive, multidimensional approach often referred to as “integrated strategic deterrence.”[10] This posture combines traditional military capabilities with non-military tools, including diplomatic, economic, and scientific strength.[11] China leverages this comprehensive power to construct a geopolitical counter-network centered on strategic economic dependence.
The Belt and Road Initiative as a Coercive Network
The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) serves as the primary mechanism for establishing China’s network, often positioning the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as the “only option” for large-scale infrastructure and energy financing for many governments.[12] This reliance generates significant economic leverage that can be used to coerce political alignment.
Crucially, China’s infrastructure development is rooted in Military-Civilian Fusion (MCF).[13] This means that civilian assets, such as rail and road networks, are explicitly dual-use, allowing the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to leverage them for military purposes, such as strengthening forward positions near contested borders.[14] By framing the rapid expansion of militarily useful infrastructure as civilian connectivity projects, Beijing normalizes its encroachment into disputed territories.[15] This ambiguity is a key characteristic of “gray zone” activities, which fall below the threshold of kinetic conflict, forcing adversaries to respond to actions technically categorized as non-military and complicating effective deterrence.[16]
The Quad: Integrated Diplomacy and the Limits of Strategic Alignment
The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad)—comprising Australia, India, Japan, and the United States—is the core diplomatic pillar of the flexible alliance network.[17] The grouping is intentionally maintained as a consultative, diplomatic partnership committed to a stable and prosperous Indo-Pacific, rather than a formalized military alliance.[18] Its main focus rests on non-traditional security domains, including health security, critical technologies, climate change, and maritime domain awareness (MDA).[19]
India’s Strategic Reluctance
The Quad’s functional capacity is structurally limited by the need to maximize political cohesion among its four diverse members. India, in particular, strongly adheres to a historical tradition of strategic autonomy and maintains an explicit rejection of formalized military alliances, a stance recently reinforced by its Minister of External Affairs publicly dismissing the concept of an “Asian NATO.”[20] India is widely regarded as the “weak link” in terms of hard security commitments, having, for instance, rejected requests to undertake joint patrolling in the South China Sea.[21]
Consequently, the Quad serves integrated deterrence through non-kinetic means. The US leverages the Quad to integrate partners through information sharing, policy alignment, and expanding research and development, particularly in advanced technologies.[22] For example, the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness funds the provision of satellite data to Pacific Island countries to enhance surveillance.[23] The current limited structure is maintained precisely because its transformation into an overt military bloc would risk India’s withdrawal,[24] demonstrating that in this network, political cohesion is often prioritized over kinetic capability.[25]
AUKUS: Accelerating Hard Power Integration and Sovereignty Risk
The AUKUS security pact between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States represents the critical hard power element of the flexible network. It signals a major commitment to defense industrial base fusion and advanced military technology transfer. The primary goal of AUKUS is to compel the parties to invest in highly interoperable military capabilities, generating real deployment options for future combined operations in response to crises.[26]
Pillar I and the Sovereignty Question
Pillar I of AUKUS focuses on Australia’s acquisition of nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs), requiring the US to share nuclear propulsion technology which is a secret previously shared only with the UK. However, this deep integration has raised significant concerns about Australia’s sovereignty, with critics arguing it necessitates a “significant surrender of Australia’s sovereignty.”[27] Specific statements from US officials have suggested that Australian SSNs will be deployed by the closest allied force, indicating that these submarines may not function as a purely sovereign capability but rather as integrated extensions of US-controlled operations.[28]
In addition, AUKUS presents a grave risk of strategic escalation. If Australian SSNs operate alongside US forces that employ tactical nuclear weapons against Chinese targets, a scenario considered in some war games to eliminate China’s nuclear second-strike capability,[29] Australia could become a primary target for nuclear retaliation, carrying a lower risk of escalation for China than striking the US mainland.[30] These risks prompt some analysts to suggest Australia should pursue a self-reliant “strategy of denial” rather than participation in a US-centric “deterrence by punishment” strategy.[31]
Pillar II and Bureaucratic Deterrence
Pillar II focuses on the collaborative development and delivery of advanced capabilities, including artificial intelligence, hypersonics, and quantum technologies. Despite the urgency of collaboration, internal US bureaucratic constraints—such as the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) and stringent classification procedures—have created significant friction.[32] Although the US Congress pushed for license-free defense trade among AUKUS partners, the subsequent implementation included a lengthy Excluded Technologies List (ETL).[33] This administrative friction over advanced technology sharing limits the speed required for integration, essentially acting as an inadvertent constraint, or bureaucratic deterrence, that negates the advantage sought by AUKUS (which is rapid interoperability).
This integration of advanced defense industries is already seeing the engagement of other partners such as the sophisticated industrial capabilities of Japan and South Korea which make them natural collaborators for future expansion, potentially evolving AUKUS into a broader technological framework.
The South Korea Submarine Deal (November 2025): Structural Transaction as Deterrence
The November 2025 announcement by the Trump administration to share nuclear propulsion technology with South Korea (ROK) for the construction of SSNs introduces a unique model for integrated deterrence, one anchored not in political trust, but in irreversible industrial dependency.[34]
Industrial Determinism and Lock-in
This concept of industrial determinism is a strategic equivalent or extension to the sociological concept of technological determinism which asserts that technology, through its own internal logic, determines the development of social structure and cultural values.[35] In a strategic context, industrial determinism posits that irreversible industrial and economic fusion, the physical integration of critical defense supply chains and capital investment, creates immutable facts on the ground, thereby determining the political and military outcomes of the alliance, irrespective of shifting political sentiments. This can be seen when taking the ROK nuclear submarine deal into account.
The strategic rationale for the deal goes beyond ROK’s immediate need to counter North Korea’s accelerated development of nuclear-armed submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs).[36] It is characterized as a “structural transaction anchored in steel, jobs, and mutual industrial dependency.”[37] The US defense industrial base faces a significant vulnerability, struggling to meet its own naval production targets and lagging far behind China’s immense shipbuilding capacity.[38] South Korea, through its Hanwha Group, committed a $5 billion investment to revitalize the Hanwha Philly Shipyard in the United States, transforming a commercial facility into a critical asset for future naval production.[39]
This investment positioned South Korea not merely as a technology recipient, but as an industrial contributor and technology partner, offering to help solve a critical US strategic problem.[40] The SSN approval is thus interpreted as the dividend of Seoul actively mitigating a US industrial shortfall.[41]
The genius of the South Korea SSN deal is the political lock-in it creates, ensuring resilience against future political swings in Washington. By physically embedding South Korean industrial capacity and capital investment into the US economy, the deal renders separation economically and strategically ruinous.[42] The creation of thousands of high-paying jobs in the revitalized domestic industry makes opposition politically self-destructive in Congress.[43] This model of alliance management prioritizes supply chain security as the basis for integrated deterrence, demonstrating that “the ultimate security guarantee is mutual, irreversible interdependence.”[44]
The “Crisis of Integration”: Why Flexible Networks Are Brittle
The primary thesis of this paper argues that the US strategy of integrated deterrence is undermined by the domestic contradictions inherent in Washington’s continued “hub” mentality. While the flexible networks (Quad, AUKUS) are designed to integrate capabilities across allies, US political signaling, bureaucratic inertia, and industrial shortfalls reinforce control over integration, rendering the network brittle and operationally hollow. The true crisis of integration stems not from allied reluctance, but from the US’s inability to fully commit to the risks and requirements of genuine partnership.
The Provocation Gap: Aggressive Signaling and Defensive Allies
The renaming of the Department of Defense (DoD) to the Department of War serves as a powerful, aggressive domestic signal that weakens the core deterrence objective abroad. While domestically framed as a restoration of strength, the rhetorical shift signals that Washington openly embraces the language of war, which risks being interpreted globally as the United States becoming the aggressor.
For key defensive allies, such as Japan, this signal is particularly destabilizing. Japan’s postwar constitution expressly renounces war (Article 9), and its gradual move toward collective self-defense has been a contentious domestic issue. An executive branch that aggressively rebrands itself as the Department of War exacerbates the public’s sensitivity and makes it politically harder for Tokyo to fully align with US strategy. For example, earlier this year Japan’s new Prime Minister, Sanae Takaichi, mentioned how potential warships invading Taiwan were a direct threat to Japan’s survival.[45] Japan, it could be argued, extended US aggressive posturing with the statement, and received backlash from China. Overall, the aggressive, unilateral branding reinforces the perception that the US is acting as a “hub,” using its allies as spokes in a conflict of its own making, rather than engaging them as equal partners in collective defense. This rhetorical shift thus heightens the risk of escalation and uncertainty in the Asia-Pacific, potentially making the US look “smaller, not stronger.”[46]
The Deterrence of Bureaucracy: The Classified Wall
Integrated deterrence, by definition, requires “seamless” coordination across allies in domains like cyber, space, and missile defense. This demands deep institutional trust and rapid information sharing.[47] Yet, as mentioned in the Honolulu Defense Forum, the US bureaucracy acts as a deliberate, and often unintended, barrier to integration, essentially creating a “bureaucratic deterrence” against its own allies.
This friction is most clearly demonstrated in the AUKUS Pillar II partnership. Despite the urgency imposed by China as a pacing threat, the collaboration is struggling to overcome barriers to information and technology sharing due to US export control regimes, specifically the ITAR and stringent classification procedures.[48]
If the US cannot declassify intelligence and critical technologies fast enough for allies to use them for planning and operations, integrated deterrence—which is built on interoperability and trust—cannot function. The US cannot credibly claim to want an integrated latticework while simultaneously hoarding the materials and intelligence needed to build it.
The Credibility Gap: Industrial Scale vs. Rhetoric
High-level assemblies, like the Honolulu Defense Forum, feature rhetoric about a “seamless wall” of allied technology, yet the operational reality is defined by severe industrial and supply chain limitations that undermine US credibility. Deterrence relies on not only capability but also the credibility that those capabilities can be sustained and deployed.
The “all bark, no bite” reality stems from the growing asymmetry between US industrial output and China’s immense scale. The US defense industrial base faces significant vulnerabilities, struggling to meet naval production targets while China’s naval shipbuilding output is estimated to be 230 times greater than that of the United States.[50]
William A. LaPlante, undersecretary of defense for acquisition and sustainment under Biden, affirmed that “production itself is deterrence.”[51] The US inability to rapidly scale production of critical assets, engineers, and ammunition creates a credibility gap. The aggressive language of the Department of War, combined with the inability to deliver the necessary industrial capacity, suggests that the US strategy may be designed merely “to survive one [war]” rather than to secure victory.[52] This gap is strategically fatal: China focuses on attaining localized advantages by leveraging its regional concentration and massive industrial scale, and the US failure to deliver its promises of industrial fusion—except in the structurally locked-in ROK deal[53]—leaves flexible networks exposed and unable to effectively counter Beijing’s military mass.
The Everpresent Ghost of Entrapment: The Cost of Strategic Flexibility
Modern nation states frequently prioritize “security flexibility” in order to avoid becoming “entrapped” through allyship, leading to the dreaded “domino effect” present in both World Wars and the Cold War. This historical fear of “entrapment”—the danger of being dragged into a military conflict over an ally’s secondary interests—drives nations toward informal security arrangements rather than binding treaty obligations. Leaders often anticipate entrapment and deliberately design alliances with escape clauses or ambiguous language to retain decision-making autonomy.
However, this calculated flexibility creates a “credibility deficit” where adversaries perceive an “if-maybe” logic rather than a firm “if-then” deterrent commitment. This environment of flexible but non-binding networks has arguably enabled recent global aggressions. In the case of Ukraine, the lack of a formal NATO treaty obligation (the Article 5 guarantee) allowed Russia to calculate that Western powers would not intervene militarily, leading to a failure of deterrence despite prior warnings.[54]
This dynamic is equally evident in Southeast Asia. The Myanmar crisis serves as a case study in how flexible, consensus-based networks like the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) can be paralyzed by the principle of non-interference, which states often use to avoid entrapment in internal conflicts. By prioritizing its image of unity over meaningful engagement, ASEAN has arguably become an enabler of the tragedy.[55] Likewise, in the South China Sea, China employs a “gradual coercive strategy” that exploits the trackless maritime environment and the blurry relationship between maritime territory and outright belligerency. The lack of firm, collective enforcement mechanisms allows Beijing to press its illegitimate “nine-dash line” claims, shifting the regional status quo while flexible networks like the Quad and AUKUS struggle to change the material balance of power through mere signaling. By seeking to avoid the risks of a major war through flexible arrangements, the United States and its allies may inadvertently create “gray zones” where revisionist powers feel they can act with impunity.
The Economic Wedge: Tariffs as Allied Alienation
While the rhetoric of integrated deterrence emphasizes “allies and partners,” the second Trump administration’s aggressive trade policy creates an economic wedge that contradicts this security logic. The imposition of “emergency” reciprocal tariffs of 15 to 20 percent on key Indo-Pacific partners—including Japan, South Korea (15%), the Philippines (19%), and Taiwan (20%)—sends a deeply mixed signal.[56] This policy treats critical security pillars as “economic adversaries” exploiting the United States through trade surpluses rather than as the overstated, indispensable strategic allies and partners.
The “Trump style” of indiscriminate tariffs operates as a blunt instrument of power, prioritizing short-term domestic transactional gains over long-term alliance management. For instance, the delay in reducing auto tariffs cost Japanese firms an estimated $20 million per day, generating intense anxiety in Tokyo about American reliability.[57] When Washington “slaps” its closest partners with punitive economic measures while simultaneously demanding they face down Chinese aggression, it fosters a perception of unreliability. This erosion of trust has already prompted leaders like Japan’s then-Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba to argue that his nation must become “less dependent on the U.S.” to avoid becoming a victim of such transactional strong-arming.[58] By using tariffs as a tool of coercion and control, the United States risks fracturing the very hard-earned coalitions required to maintain a free and open Indo-Pacific and support the integrated deterrence strategy.
Synthesis and Conclusion
The contemporary competition in the Indo-Pacific is defined by the struggle between China’s comprehensive, coercive network and the US-led flexible latticework designed for integrated deterrence. China leverages its industrial scale, economic dependencies (BRI), and regional concentration of military power to challenge US primacy. The US response, characterized by the hub-and-spokes 2.0 model, utilizes a combination of diplomatic platforms (Quad) and hard-power arrangements (AUKUS, ROK SSN deal) to build a layered defense posture.
The strategic divergence in these architectures and the mechanisms’ respective commitment to integrated deterrence are synthesized below:
Table 1. Comparison of Great Power Network Architectures: US Flexible Alliances vs. China’s Coercive Network
| Feature | US-led flexible alliance networks (hub-and-spokes 2.0) | China’s coercive network (BRI/PLA) |
| Primary Goal | Integrated deterrence, interoperability, defense of international norms | Strategic primacy, regional concentration, creating economic dependencies |
| Mechanism Type | Minilaterals (Quad, AUKUS), bilateral alliances, high-end tech transfer | Economic leverage (BRI), dual-use infrastructure (rail, digital), gray zone activities |
| Strength Basis | Networked resilience, shared industrial base (ROK SSN deal) | Industrial scale (shipbuilding), regional military concentration |
| Core Weakness | Bureaucratic inertia (ITAR/classification) and sovereignty dilution concerns | Dependence on economic leverage, potential for debt trap resistance and policy alternatives |
The analysis demonstrates that while the Quad secures diplomatic cohesion and resilience in non-traditional domains, it remains structurally limited by India’s strategic constraints. AUKUS represents the kinetic core but faces significant bureaucratic hurdles—the slow pace of technological integration due to internal US regulation may negate the advantage of hard-power collaboration.
The South Korea SSN deal, however, presents a robust counter-model for integrated deterrence. By prioritizing defense-industrial fusion and mutual economic necessity, ROK secured technology transfer by solving a critical industrial vulnerability for the United States. This “industrial determinism” model, summarized below, achieves a unique and high level of structural resilience, potentially setting a benchmark for future flexible network partnerships aimed at countering China’s overwhelming scale advantage in critical areas such as shipbuilding.
Table 2. The ROK SSN Deal: Strategic Rationale vs. Industrial Lock-in
| Rationale | Traditional geopolitical assessment | Integrated deterrence |
| Policy Driver | US political concession to key ally | ROK’s strategy to force interdependence by solving US industrial vulnerability |
| Value Exchange | ROK receives advanced nuclear technology for its security needs | ROK provides $350 billion in investment and expertise to assist US defense industrial base |
| Resilience Mechanism | Dependent on the political trust of the current/future US administration | Anchored in steel and jobs; creation of domestic US constituency (Philly Shipyard revitalization) that opposes short-term cancellation |
| Long-Term Impact | Arms deal boosts ROK maritime power | Industrial fusion that structurally locks the US into maritime co-dependence with ROK |
The contemporary competition in the Indo-Pacific is defined by the struggle between China’s comprehensive, coercive network and the US-led flexible latticework designed for integrated deterrence. China leverages its industrial scale, economic dependencies, and regional concentration of military power to challenge US primacy. The US response is composed of a combination of diplomatic platforms like the Quad and hard-power arrangements like AUKUS to build a layered defense posture.
In conclusion, the efficacy of flexible networks hinges on their ability to overcome internal bureaucratic friction, as demonstrated by the challenges in AUKUS, and to move beyond symbolic, and at times arguably useless, political assurances toward binding, structural transactions like the South Korea nuclear submarine agreement. By integrating industrial bases and supply chains, these arrangements anchor security commitments in mutual economic necessity, providing a robust form of integrated deterrence against China’s expansive and coercive network strategy.
However, if US flexible alliance networks truly wish to fully commit to integrated deterrence, deeper operational and economic integration is necessary. The United States must improve its signaling and treat its partners as true allies; the current use of punitive tariffs, unilateral decision-making, and outdated information-sharing restrictions frame Washington as an unreliable and risky partner. As observed during the Honolulu Defense Forum, while keynote speakers remained unwavering in their rhetorical emphasis on allies and partners, the persistent demand from the stage and breakout sessions remained clear: Washington must build genuine trust and institutionalize the easier transfer of technology and intelligence. Without addressing these crucial core needs, integrated deterrence remains an aspirational diplomatic concept rather than a credible military reality.
Ana Aravena is a graduate student and a member of the Indo-Pacific Policy Lab at the University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa.
The views expressed in this publication are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Center for Indo-Pacific Affairs or any organization with which the author is affiliated.
© 2026 University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa Center for Indo-Pacific Affairs. All rights reserved.
[1] Britannica Dictionary, s.v. “deterrence.”
[2] Chris Dolan, “Integrated Deterrence and US Defense Strategy in NATO and AUKUS: An Analysis of Advanced Technologies and Multi-Domain Operations in Alliance Systems,” Strategic Horizons (Fall 2025): 379–406.
[3] Ibid.
[4] The White House, National Security Strategy, US Government, October 2022.
[5] Dolan, “Integrated Deterrence and US Defense Strategy in NATO and AUKUS.”
[6] Victor D. Cha, Powerplay: The Origins of the American Alliance System in Asia, Princeton University Press, 2016.
[7] Victor D. Cha, “Powerplay: Origins of the U.S. Alliance System in Asia,” International Security 34 (3), Winter 2009/10, 158–196.
[8] Cha, Powerplay, 2016.
[9] The White House, “Restoring the United States Department of War,” United States Government, September 5, 2025.
[10] Michael S. Chase and Arthur Chan, China’s Evolving Approach to “Integrated Strategic Deterrence”, RAND, April 7, 2016.
[11] Geoffrey R. Pyatt, “Assessing U.S. Efforts to Counter China’s Coercive Belt and Road Diplomacy,” United States Department of State, June 14, 2023.
[12] Ibid.
[13] Thomas Hader, Benjamin Jensen, Divya Ramjee, and Jose M. Macias III, China’s Gray-Zone Infrastructure Strategy on the Tibetan Plateau: Roads, Dams, and Digital Domination, Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 4, 2025.
[14] Ibid.
[15] Ibid.
[16] Michael J. Mazarr, Joe Cheravitch, Jeffrey W. Hornung, and Stephanie Pezard, What Deters and Why: Applying a Framework to Assess Deterrence of Gray Zone Aggression, RAND, April 19, 2021.
[17] Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, “The Quad,” Australian Government.
[18] Ibid.
[19] Ibid.
[20] Aparna Pande, “India’s Evolving Role in the Quad,” Hudson Institute, November 29, 2024.
[21] Aditi Malhotra, “Engagement, Not Entanglement: India’s Relationship with the Quad,” Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, May 1, 2023.
[22] Justin L. Diehl, “Indo-Pacific Deterrence and the Quad in 2030,” Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, January 29, 2021.
[23] Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, “The Quad.”
[24] Pande, “India’s Evolving Role in the Quad.”
[25] Arzan Tarapore, “What the Quad Could Learn from AUKUS,” The Interpreter, Lowy Institute, April 3, 2023.
[26] Stefan Markowski, Robert Wylie, and Satish Chand, “The AUKUS Agreement: A New Form of the Plurilateral Defence Alliance? A View from Downunder,” Defense & Security Analysis 40 (3), 2024, 430–449.
[27] Mike Keating and Jon Stanford, “Ditch AUKUS Pillar One. It Involves Australia Too Much in US Strategy,” The Strategist, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, August 22, 2025.
[28] Ibid.
[29] Ibid.
[30] Justin Anderson and Chris Andrews, China’s Theater-Range, Dual-Capable Delivery Systems: Integrated Deterrence and Risk Reduction Approaches to Counter a Growing Threat, Strategic Trends Research Initiative, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, August 2024.
[31] Keating and Stanford, “Ditch AUKUS Pillar One.”
[32] Allyson Park, “U.S., U.K. Australia Still Ironing Out Tech, Info Sharing Kinks,” National Defense Magazine, March 7, 2025.
[33] House Armed Services Committee, “Rogers, McCaul Urge President Biden to Remove Unnecessary Barriers Restricting Full Potential of Aukus Pillar Two,” October 2, 2024.
[34] Farheen Hussain, “South Korea to Build Nuclear-Powered Submarines in Historic U.S. Deal,” Asia Media Centre, December 9, 2025; Brent D. Sadler, “The Optimum Pathway for Building Nuclear Submarines with South Korea and Japan,” Center for International Maritime Security, November 28, 2025.
[35] Sally Wyatt, “Technological Determinism is Dead; Long Live Technological Determinism,” in The Handbook of Science and Technology Studies, Edward J. Hackett et al. (ed.), MIT Press, January 2008.
[36] Sadler, “The Optimum Pathway for Building Nuclear Submarines.”
[37] Seong-Hyon Lee, “The Logic Behind South Korea’s Nuclear Submarine Deal,” The Interpreter, Lowy Institute, November 3, 2025.
[38] Ibid.
[39] Hanwha, “Hanwha Announces $5 Billion Philly Shipyard Investment as Part of South Korea’s Commitment to US Shipbuilding Growth,” August 27, 2025.
[40] Lee, “The Logic Behind South Korea’s Nuclear Submarine Deal.”
[41] Ibid.
[42] Ibid.
[43] JobswithDOD, “Thousands of Jobs Coming as Philadelphia Lands Submarine Deal,” November 10, 2025.
[44] Lee, “The Logic Behind South Korea’s Nuclear Submarine Deal.”
[45] Bonny Lin and Kristi Govella, “Escalating Japan-China Tensions: Insights from the Past and Prospects for the Future,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, December 5, 2025.
[46] Walter Ladwig, “The Department of War Makes America Look Weak,” Royal United Services Institute for Defense and Security Studies, September 5, 2025.
[47] Cynthia R. Cook and Audrey Aldisert, “Overcoming the Barriers to Forward Deterrence,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 1, 2025.
[48] Park, “U.S., U.K. Australia Still Ironing Out Tech, Info Sharing Kinks.”
[49] Ibid.
[50] Bence Nemeth, “How a US ‘Suez Moment’ Could Hollow the US Alliance System,” Texas National Security Review 9 (1), Winter 2026, 82–96.
[51] Park, “U.S., U.K. Australia Still Ironing Out Tech, Info Sharing Kinks.”
[52] Nemeth, “How a US ‘Suez Moment’ Could Hollow the US Alliance System.”
[53] Lee, “The Logic Behind South Korea’s Nuclear Submarine Deal.”
[54] Mykhailo Soldatenko, “Getting Ukraine’s Security Agreements Right,” Carnegie Endowment, July 8, 2024.
[55] Tin Shine Aung, “ASEAN’s Centrality Depends on a Shift to Collective Security,” East Asia Forum, August 19, 2025.
[56] US Representative Jill Tokuda “Rep. Tokuda Introduces Bill to Repeal Tariffs on Indo-Pacific Allies Including Japan, South Korea, Taiwan & the Philippines,” November 24, 2025.
[57] Kristi Govella, “Japan’s Response to Trump 2.0: Sustaining U.S. Ties, Strengthening International Partnerships,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, October 6, 2025.
[58] Ibid.