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Review

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The story of Sikhism is clearly and simply told. Since it is of late date it presents no archaeological data, but its chapter is accompanied by clear sunlit pictures of the splendid shrines at Amritsar, Lahore and Tarn Taran.

On the whole, this work is a well-ordered compilation of valuable materials not heretofore brought together according to a comprehensive plan. By placing his materials in relation and perspective so as to give a rounded picture of the great faiths in their cultural setting Mr. Finegan has earned the gratitude of all teachers of history of religions.

In conclusion, it must be said that the price of \$10.00 militates against use of the book as a class-room text. But many individuals will want to add it to their personal collections, and certainly it should be in all college and public libraries. It can be recommended to anyone interested in the roots of historic cultures.

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Essays in East-West Philosophy: An Attempt at World Philosophical Synthesis.

Edited and with an introduction by CHARLES A. MOORE. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1951. xii, 467. \$5.00.

This volume is the report of the second East-West Philosophers' Conference, held at the University of Hawaii in 1949. The purpose of the Conference was first conceived in 1939 to be the study of the possibility of a world philosophy through a synthesis of the ideas and ideals of the East and the West. (*Philosophy East and West*, Princeton University Press, 1946, "Preface," vii). But a realization of the fact that such a world philosophy is not possible, nor desirable even if attainable, made it necessary to reformulate the problem as "the study of Eastern and Western conceptions of ultimate reality in their relations to the empirical world and human values—and a consideration of the method used in East and West to reach the respective conceptions of ultimate reality found in those two traditions." Consequently the book is divided into three parts: methodology, metaphysics, and ethics and social philosophy. The fourth part contains conclusions and prospects. The volume is extremely rich in informational data, contributed mostly by philosophers from the East; the proposed syntheses are also very suggestive. The "Introduction" by Moore, gives an excellent analysis and summary of the contents of the book. In it he sets forth the aim of the conference: an attempt at world philosophical synthesis.

Suzuki's "Reason and Intuition in Buddhist Philosophy" describes the indefinable method of Buddhism with a "scrupulous accuracy and integrity" (E. R. Hughes' words, p. 49). However, Hughes' own paper on "Epistemological Methods in Chinese Philosophy" is rather disappointing. His treatment of an historical method and a literary style as Chinese philosophical methods reveals only his own preoccupation, and may be compared to treating John Lyly's euphuism as the dominant type of Western epistemology.

Dhirendra Mohan Datta's "Epistemological Methods in Indian Philosophy" gives a brief account of Indian epistemology with some significant conclusions: "In epistemology, as elsewhere, the Indian mind has regarded philosophical discussion as a means to a better life." (p. 87) "Reason and argument, therefore, find their full place here as in Western Philosophy. If there are differences between certain Indian and Western Ideas and beliefs, we have only to bear in mind that there have been greater differences between Indians and Indians, as well as (between) Westerners and Westerners. So, these differences may not be all racial but mostly individual. On the other hand, there is ample similarity and identity of thought as well between the Indian and the Westerner." (p. 88) I quote this passage at length because the opinion is shared by almost all members of the Conference.

Swami Nikhilananda in his "Concentration and Meditation as a method in Indian philosophy" tells us how through yoga one can withdraw his mind from all extraneous things and identify himself solely with his thought. "His mind then becomes like a crystal." (p. 93) When the mind becomes free of all impressions, "a man's true and complete nature is revealed." (p. 94)

Edwin A. Burt in his essay "Problems in Harmonizing East and West" takes the same point of view as that of Datta's in approaching the problem of harmonizing Eastern and Western philosophies. He believes that appreciative understanding and mutual comprehension among peoples can be achieved at the philosophical level. (p. 110) He conceives of an expanding cooperative inquiry to reach the goal of building a world philosophy by applying two valid rules: impartiality and inclusiveness. He attempts to harmonize the "apparent contradiction" between two or more philosophical positions by adopting a neutral "generic" definition of important ideas. Though begging the issue at the very outset in assuming the contradiction to be "apparent," this attempt together with a sympathetic assimilation of a foreign language in which ideas of that foreign culture are expressed will serve to improve the chance for appreciative understanding. But this appreciative understanding will not lead to a one-world philosophy. It is appreciative understanding rather than a world philosophy that should be the end of our cooperative inquiry.

William Ray Dennes' "Empirico-Naturalism and World understanding" is a definite statement about Western empiricism and naturalism. He concludes: "What I have here called empiricism or naturalism cannot as such entail or exclude any existent or any experience or any opinion." (p. 149) In this he seems to have thrown the door wide open for the recognition of other systems and for world understanding and peace. But, with a profound understanding of the logical implications of every important philosophical system, he subjects each and all to a searching analysis and points out significantly that whatever basic set of categories employed, and in whatever manner terms like "true," "probable," "knowledge" are defined, when epistemological questions come up, one invariably will have to fall back on activities characterized as "observing," "discovering," or "exploring," methods characteristic to Western empiricism and naturalism.

Filmer S. C. Northrop, in his "Methodology and Epistemology, Oriental and Occidental," reiterates his main thesis that the West employs concept by postulation and the East concept by intuition. The value of the distinction is vitiated by two considerations: first, the same distinction holds between systems within the same culture; and secondly, what Northrop called the "undifferentiated aesthetic continuum" is but another concept by postulation, and not at all adequate to the Tao, or Nirvana or Brahman. It seems to me methods are determined by the ends to which they are methods. If the ends of different philosophical systems are different, no amount of genius in creating a "neutral language" will help bridge over the difference.

Wing-tsit Chan in his "Synthesis in Chinese Metaphysics" characterizes Chinese philosophy by its ability to synthesize. But his statement that "If in our search for a world perspective in philosophy we rely chiefly on theoretical foundations and logical subtlety, I am afraid Chinese philosophy has little to offer," (p. 163) is true only in a qualified way. In Taoism and in Neo-Confucianism theoretical foundations are certainly there, though in a form not as recognizable as in Western philosophical systems. But it is perfectly true that "Chinese philosophers... have always been interested more in a good life and a good society than in organized knowledge." (p. 163) I presume by "organized knowledge" is meant scientific knowledge rather than philosophical wisdom.

Gunapala Piyasena Malalasekera's "Some Aspects of Reality as Taught by Theravada (Hinayana) Buddhism" describes Buddhism as primarily a way of life. Shinsho Hanayama in his essay "Buddhism of the One Great Vehicle (Mahayana)" also described Sakyamuni Buddha's teaching as being "centered on our daily life." (p. 196) R. P. Raju in his "Metaphysical Theories in Indian Philosophy," while emphasizing the spiritual aspect of the various off-shoots of the Vedic tradition, believes that elements from Western philosophy should be incorporated in Indian philosophy "in order to make up for its one-sided preoccupation with the realm of spirit." (p. 227) Swami Nikhilananda's "The Nature of Brahman in the Upanisads—the Avaita View" is strictly an informational analysis.

John Wild in his "Certain Basic Concepts of Western Realism and Their Relation to Oriental Thought" defines the aim of philosophy to be "to gain a certain detachment from such extraneous, particularizing (referring to cultural limitations) influences, in order to penetrate to what is really sound and true." (p. 250) Our task, he says, is "that of attaining agreement among ourselves concerning the nature of existence itself." (p. 250) Based on this principle of being, with his realistic emphasis on evidence, he believes he can find room for all isms. The only viewpoint to be ruled out is the "nothing but" type of reductionism.

George P. Conger in his "Integration" proposes "a combination, or successive combinations, of parts forming wholes, which, as wholes, have properties other than those of the parts taken severally." (p. 271) This is a synoptic view of things, based on the theory of emergent evolution, and Mr. Conger calls it "integration."

Wilmon Henry Sheldon in his "Main Contrasts between Eastern and Western Philosophy" believes the contrasts to be fundamental and mentions three fundamental ones: the inner over against the external, the other-worldly over against the worldly, and eternity over against time. Despite these contrasts Sheldon suggests that "just because the two halves of man's earthly home do differ in the said perspectives, they can, if men will, be combined in a great harmony." (p. 288)

Y. P. Mei's "The Basis of Social, Ethical and Spiritual Values in Chinese Philosophy" is a good account of Chinese ethical systems. However, it might be of greater interest to the scholars from the West if he had linked them up with China's social, political and economic background, furnishing a clue to the nature of Chinese society. And he might have brought the account up to date.

T. M. P. Mahadevan's "The Basis of Social, Ethical and Spiritual Values in Indian Philosophy" is interesting for Mr. Mahadevan's interpretation of castes. While giving "the attainment of sorrowlessness" as the common goal of all the schools of Indian philosophy, Mr. Mahadevan justifies the caste system as "a law of spiritual economics." Though the caste system is conceived to be a social institution, according to Mahadevan, to be discarded to suit changing conditions, he does not explain how it could maintain itself so rigidly throughout the long history of India. He is keenly aware of the fact that "no nation can rise higher than the level of its proletariat," (p. 328) and yet makes heredity a working principle in his spiritual economics and sees no social injustice involved. Mahadevan seems to be an apologist, and a bad one, of the Indian caste system.

Charles Morris' "Comparative Strength of Life-Ideals in Eastern and Western Cultures" is a quantitative study of life-ideals in various cultures. Its inconclusive nature seems to me to be due to the following reasons: The inherent deficiency of statistical methods in a study like this, the uncertain level of maturity of the students polled in the understanding of the problems, and the fact that modern peoples have already come out of their traditional shell. It seems to suggest that attempts at integration of ideals in various traditions is no longer necessary, for a world culture is already in the process of making.

Northrop in his "The Theory of Types and the Verification of Ethical theories" applies his theory of East by concept of intuition and West by concept of postulation in the ethical field. He believes that the two can be reconciled by a "new, fresh, technically formulated specific philosophy." (p. 381)

As a whole the volume is a testimony to the great success of the East-West Philosophers' Conference, a monumental contribution to world understanding on a philosophical level. It puts in the hands of a reader a wealth of information and suggestions not easily available in such a compact volume. The University of Hawaii and Professor Moore are to be congratulated for putting out a work of such caliber.

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